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INTRODUCTION 
“I have two words to leave you with tonight, ladies and gentleman: 
inclusion rider,” said actress Frances McDormand at the conclusion of her 
acceptance speech for the best actress Oscar during the March 4, 2018, 
Academy Awards.1  McDormand later explained that “You can ask for and/or 
demand at least 50 percent diversity in not only the casting but also the crew,” 
                                               
 * Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Operations, Elisabeth 
Haub School of Law at Pace University.  J.D., 2002, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1999, Yale 
University.  Warmest thanks to the editors of the Belmont Law Review for inviting me to 
participate in this symposium. 
 1. Carol Buckley & Daniel Victor, What Did Frances McDormand Mean by an 
“Inclusion Rider” at the Oscars?, N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2
018/03/05/movies/inclusion-rider-frances-mcdormand-oscars.html. 
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noting that she had “just learned” about that idea “after 35 years of being in 
the film business.”2 
McDormand was specifically drawing on the work of Professor 
Stacy Smith, a University of Southern California communications professor 
who coined the “inclusion rider” concept and term several years ago to 
address the lack of diversity within Hollywood.3  Although the inclusion rider 
need not involve a demand for 50 percent diversity, the basic concept was for 
prominent actors and actresses to insist upon, as riders to their individual 
contracts, a certain level of diversity among the cast and crew.4  Professor 
Smith first introduced the idea in a Hollywood Reporter op-ed in 20145 and 
delivered a widely-watched TED Talk about it in 2016.6  At the inaugural 
Bloomberg Business of Equality Summit in May of 2018, she explained: 
[I was] sitting in my office one day, and I was thinking about 
contracts . . . and I thought to myself, if an A-lister simply 
does one thing, we could change the epidemic of invisibility, 
and the lack of females being on-screen, in seven years. All 
A-listers would have to do is leverage their power and put a 
clause in their contract that stipulates that equality must be 
part of the process. And that’s what we did. It’s been adopted 
by Michael B. Jordan, Brie Larsen, Matt Damon, Ben 
Affleck, and most importantly, William Morris Endeavors 
Talent Agency . . . .7 
The Annenberg Inclusion Initiative at USC, a think tank led by 
Professor Smith, now offers a sample “inclusion rider template” on its 
                                               
 2. Abigail Hess, Oscar Winner Frances McDormand Encourages Actors to Push for 
“Inclusion Riders”—Here’s What That Means, CNBC (March 5, 2018), https://www.cnbc. 
com/2018/03/05/frances-mcdormand-encourages-actors-to-push-for-inclusion-riders.html. 
 3. Omar Yousif, Professor Coined Term Inclusion Rider, DAILY TROJAN (March 6, 
2018), https://dailytrojan.com/2018/03/06/professor-coined-term-inclusion-rider/. 
 4. Stacy Smith, Hey, Hollywood: It’s Time to Adopt the NFL’s Rooney Rule—For 
Women, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/hey-
hollywood-time-adopt-nfls-754659. The “Rooney Rule” is an NFL policy stating that all 
teams must interview at least one minority for head coach and other senior positions. See, e.g., 
Kenneth Johnson, What Corporations Can Learn About Diversity from the NFL’s Rooney 
Rule, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescoachescouncil/2018/02/01
/what-corporations-can-learn-about-diversity-from-the-nfls-rooney-rule/#78c6e2e747de; 
Harry Lyles, Jr., The NFL’s Rooney Rule Won’t Solve Tech’s Diversity Problem, THE VERGE 
(June 5, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/5/17424992/facebook-amazon-diversity-
hiring-rooney-rule. 
 5. Smith, supra note 4. 
 6. Stacy Smith, The Data Behind Hollywood’s Sexism, TED (Oct. 2016), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/stacy_smith_the_data_behind_hollywood_s_sexism/transcript?la
nguage=en. 
 7. Stacey Smith, What is the Inclusion Rider Initiative, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2018-05-09/what-is-the-inclusion-rider-initiative-
video. 
2019] INCLUSION RIDERS 231 
website.8  The template sets forth casting and hiring objectives for both 
supporting roles (“Wherever possible, the Director and Casting Director will 
select qualified members of under-represented groups for supporting roles in 
a manner that matches the expected demographics of the film’s setting”)9 and 
off-screen positions (“The producer or studio shall make all reasonable 
efforts to fill those positions with qualified and available individuals who 
have been under-represented in that position”).10  Additionally, the sample 
rider includes a compliance mechanism, whereby a quantitative analysis is 
performed to measure whether the targets were met; if not, the studio is 
required to make a charitable contribution.11 
The “inclusion rider” concept dovetails with a growing trend in 
corporate America, in which several major corporations have begun 
requiring their outside law firms to meet numerical diversity targets in 
working on their specific matters.  In 2017, Facebook announced that it 
would require “women and ethnic minorities [to] account for at least 33 
percent of law firm teams working on its matters.”12  That same year, Hewlett 
Packard (“HP”) similarly set forth a numerical minimum for how many 
female and ethnically diverse attorneys must work on their matters, warning 
law firms that it would “withhold up to 10 [percent] of all amounts invoiced 
by law firms that d[id] not meet or exceed [its] minimal diverse staffing 
requirements.”13  Other corporations, such as MetLife, Microsoft, and Shell, 
have taken similar action.14  Even prior to these developments, the NFL had 
                                               
 8. Kalpana Kotagel, at al., Inclusion Rider Template, USC ANNENBERG (March 2018), 
http://assets.uscannenberg.org.s3.amazonaws.com/docs/inclusion-rider-template.pdf. 
 9. Id. at ¶4.a.ii. 
 10. Id. at ¶4.b. 
 11. Id. at ¶8. 
 12. Ellen Rosen, Facebook Pushes Outside Law Firms on Diversity, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/02/business/dealbook/facebook-pushes-outside-
law-firms-to-become-more-diverse.html. 
 13. Letter from Kim M. Rivera, HP Chief Legal Officer, to Law Firm Partners (Feb. 8, 
2017), (instructing all U.S.-based law firms with at least 10 attorneys that, “[i]n order to 
comply with the requirement, firms must field (i) at least one diverse Firm relationship partner, 
regularly engaged with HP on billing and staffing issues; or (ii) at least one woman and one 
racially/ethnically diverse attorney, each performing or managing at least 10% of the billable 
hours worked on HP matters”), https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judi
cialstudies/panel_-5-hp_diversity_mandate_to_partner_law-firms_.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 
2018). 
 14. See Mary Flood, Shell Lawyer: There’s More to Diversity Than Lip Service, HOUS. 
CHRON. (May 13, 2007), https://www.chron.com/business/article/Shell-lawyer-There-s-more-
to-diversity-than-lip-1800430.php (describing the push by Shell’s general counsel to “insist[] 
on diversity and inclusiveness in her workplace and the places she hired,” such as requiring 
Shell’s law firms “to account . . . for how many female and minority lawyers work on Shell 
business, for how many hours they work and what they do”); Brad Smith, Announcing the 
Next Generation of Microsoft’s Law Firm Diversity Program: Working Towards a More 
Diverse and Inclusive Legal Profession, MICROSOFT ON ISSUES (Aug. 4, 2015), 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2015/08/04/announcing-the-next-generation-of-
microsofts-law-firm-diversity-program-working-towards-a-more-diverse-and-inclusive-
legal-profession/ [https://perma.cc/4HQQ-F6KF] (describing bonus structure of up to two 
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adopted the related “Rooney Rule” in 2003, which requires football teams to 
interview at least one person of color for head coaching and high-level 
executive positions and, as of 2016, also interview at least one woman for 
executive positions.15  However, the Rooney Rule differs from the more 
recent policies, in that it does not set goals for the ultimate outcome and only 
covers the interviewing process.16 
These overlapping and converging movements have the worthy and 
important goals of promoting equal employment opportunity and addressing 
the under-representation of women and ethnic minorities in a variety of 
workplace settings.  But their co-existence with Title VII’s prohibition of 
differential treatment of employees based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin17 is unclear.  For example, if a law firm replaces a male 
attorney with a female attorney on a client team in direct response to a client’s 
threat to withhold full payment unless the team has a certain percentage of 
women, could that male attorney have a successful Title VII claim?  
Similarly, if a Hollywood studio complies with an A-list actor’s inclusion 
rider by only considering “individuals who have been under-represented” for, 
say, a production manager position, is there a viable Title VII claim for 
rejected job applicants who are of non-under-represented ethnicities? 
Unsurprisingly, the very day after Frances McDormand’s “inclusion 
rider” speech at the Academy Awards, the California office of a leading 
employment law firm, Proskauer Rose, issued a brief memo to provide a 
cautionary note to its clients.  Proskauer emphasized that “although an actor 
may request that good faith efforts be undertaken to hire a diverse crew, 
demanding that certain race or gender quotas be met could run afoul of Title 
VII.”18 The update concluded that employers “should be wary of agreeing to 
riders demanding that specific quotas be met.”19 
In this piece, I situate these sorts of diversity requests within the 
broader context of other customer/client preferences that implicate Title VII.  
To be sure, the “inclusion riders” are not literal customer/client requests, but 
rather requests from celebrities who are themselves being hired by the 
employer for a specific project.  Broadly speaking, however, they raise the 
                                               
percent of the legal fees billed to the company “based on their performance in increasing 
diversity in three aspects of a firm’s leadership. . . . (1) leading the management of the law 
firm; (2) leading the law firm’s relationship with Microsoft; and (3) leading work on 
Microsoft’s legal matters”); Casey Sullivan, Deadline for Diversity Issued by Top MetLife 
Lawyer, BIG L. BUS. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://biglawbusiness.com/deadline-for-diversity-issued-
by-top-metlife-lawyer/. 
 15. See Lyles, Jr., supra note 4. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 18. Tony Oncidi & Pietro Deserio, “Inclusion Riders” On the Storm, PROSKAUER CAL. 
EMP. L. UPDATE (Mar. 5, 2018), https://calemploymentlawupdate.proskauer.com/2018/03/in
clusion-riders-on-the-storm/. 
 19. Id. 
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same legal issue regarding third-party preferences that implicate protected 
characteristics under Title VII. 
As a starting point, the general rule within employment 
discrimination law is that customer preferences cannot justify discriminatory 
treatment by employers.20  That baseline has led courts to rule that employers 
cannot, for instance, hire only female flight attendants on grounds that people 
prefer to be served by women,21 or accommodate racist customers’ requests 
for white employees.22  However, there are certain openings within federal 
employment discrimination law for some customer/client preferences, in 
some situations, to provide successful defenses to what would otherwise 
likely be actionable discrimination.  In a recent article, I provided a taxonomy 
of those preferences, which I deem the “preferred preferences.”23  Such 
preferences include (1) aesthetic appeal; (2) physical privacy from 
employees of the opposite sex; (3) psychological comfort/affinity with 
employees of the same sex; (4) an English-speaking environment; (5) the 
desire not to be proselytized to/feel judged; and (6) convenience.24  As I noted 
there, an open question is whether diversity itself may become a seventh 
preferred preference to which courts will defer. 
This piece addresses that specific question.  First, I describe the 
broader context of “preferred preferences” within Title VII.  Second, I 
explore how the diversity preference does—and does not—fit into that 
landscape, and how it connects up with affirmative action doctrine.  I 
conclude with some suggestions about the best ways for employers to 
respond to the growing diversity preference. 
I. THE BROADER CONTEXT: “PREFERRED PREFERENCES” WITHIN 
TITLE VII 
There are four key openings within Title VII for customer 
preferences to provide employer defenses to what would otherwise likely be 
actionable discrimination.  Three of them come from Title VII’s text itself, 
and the fourth is a judicially-created doctrine. 
A. The BFOQ Defense 
First, although Title VII prohibits disparate treatment on the basis of 
an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, it includes a bona 
fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) defense for three of those 
                                               
 20. Sparenberg v. Eagle All., No. JFM-14-1667, 2015 WL 6122809, at *6 (D. Md. Oct. 
15, 2015). 
 21. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971); Wilson 
v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 294, 302 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 22. See Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 23. Emily Gold Waldman, The Preferred Preferences in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 97 N.C. L. REV. 91, 95 (2019). 
 24. Id. 
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characteristics: sex, religion, or national origin.25  Specifically, Title VII 
provides that disparate treatment on the basis of religion, sex, or national 
origin is permissible “in those certain instances where religion, sex, or 
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary 
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”26 
Can customer preferences for an employee of a particular religion, 
sex, or national origin give rise to a BFOQ?  Usually, the answer is no.27 
However, in a narrow exception, courts have ruled that when the request 
stems from a customer preference for physical privacy from employees of 
the opposite sex28—or, occasionally, from a preference for the psychological 
comfort that accompanies being with an employee of the same sex29—a valid 
BFOQ can be created.  The customer preference for convenience can also 
play a supporting role here, because sometimes the only way to accommodate 
customers’ physical privacy preferences without significantly 
inconveniencing them is to hire employees of a particular sex for the job.  For 
example, a Tennessee district court ruled in favor of the Transportation 
Security Agency’s argument that female sex was a BFOQ for an open airport 
screener position because the TSA needed to have a certain number of female 
screeners to be able to perform same-gender pat downs in a reasonable time 
frame.30 
Thus, the BFOQ defense provides one important customer 
preference opening, through which customers’ physical privacy, 
psychological comfort, and convenience preferences can sometimes enter to 
create a successful employer defense. 
B. The “Job-Related and Consistent with Business Necessity” 
Defense 
The second customer preference opening within Title VII arises in 
the context of disparate impact claims.  In addition to prohibiting disparate 
treatment on the basis of the aforementioned characteristics, Title VII also 
prohibits facially-neutral policies that have a disparate impact as to those 
                                               
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Chaney, 612 F.3d at 913; Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 
389 (5th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 294, 302 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 28. See, e.g., Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1423 (N.D. Ill. 
1984); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80-1374-W, 1982 WL 3108, at *5 (W.D. Okla. 
Feb. 2, 1982); Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1195–96 (E.D. Ark. 1981), 
vacated, 671 F.2d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1982); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. 
Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978), aff’d, 591 F.2d 1334 (1979). 
 29. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 30. Wade v. Napolitano, No. 3–07–0892, 2009 WL 9071049, at * 2 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 
24, 2009) (deferring to TSA’s determination “that no less than 33% of screeners needed to be 
women to ensure the availability of same gender-searches without compromising security or 
significantly increasing wait times at checkpoints”) (emphasis added). 
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characteristics.31  But Title VII also provides a defense: the employer can 
continue to use that policy if it can show that the practice is “job related for 
the position in question and consistent with business necessity,” and that an 
alternative practice would not suffice.32  Thus, here, the question is whether 
employers can make out the business necessity showing by arguing that the 
facially-neutral policy responds to a strong customer preference. 
Two customer preferences have come up in this context: aesthetic 
appeal and an English-speaking environment.  With regard to aesthetic 
appeal, plaintiff employees have had mixed success in challenging facially-
neutral appearance policies that have an alleged disparate impact on race.33  
Similarly, customers’ expressed or assumed preferences for employees to 
speak English in their presence have also been held to satisfy the business 
necessity defense.34  Specifically, several courts have held that employers are 
justified in fearing that if customers overhear employees conversing with 
each other in another language, they will find those employees less 
approachable and may even think that the employees are mocking them.35  
That said, courts are not as tolerant of policies that require employees to 
speak English at all times, as opposed to only when they can be overheard by 
customers.36 
C. The “Undue Hardship” Defense 
The third customer preference opening in Title VII’s text arises in 
connection with religious accommodation claims.  Title VII recognizes, as a 
                                               
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2012). 
 32. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). 
 33. Compare Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993) (ruling 
in favor of African-American employee who challenged no-beard rule on grounds that it had 
a disparate impact on African-American man, who were more likely to have a medical 
condition that made shaving unhealthy), with EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 
1018, 1035 (11th Cir. 2016) (ruling against African-American female employee who 
challenged no-dreadlocks rules), and Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 
259, 265–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (ruling against African-American male employee who 
challenged employer’s requirement that employees wear a hat over their dreadlocks, or other 
“unbusinesslike” hairstyles). Note that in the latter cases, the plaintiff employee did not fully 
flesh out the disparate impact argument, so the courts did not explicitly address whether the 
assumed customer preferences that gave rise to these rules could rise to the level of business 
necessity. 
 34. See, e.g., Pacheco v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 599, 614, 621-22 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC, 419 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 35. See, e.g., Pacheco, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 614, 621-22; Sephora, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 416-
17. 
 36. See, e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556-57 (N.D. 
Tex. 1999) (striking down blanket “English-only” rule and noting the distinction between rules 
that apply to all times and places and those that are more limited). EEOC regulations also 
differentiate between rules that require “employees to speak only English at all times in the 
workplace,” which are viewed as presumptively violating Title VII, and English-only rules 
that are applied “only at certain times,” which can be permissible if “justified by business 
necessity.” 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a)–(b). 
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form of religious discrimination, the failure to accommodate an employee’s 
religious observance or practice—unless the “employer demonstrates that he 
is unable to reasonably accommodate [the] religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”37  This, 
too, provides a potential opening: if the employer can show that the 
accommodation will upset or offend customers, then the employer may be 
able to argue that the accommodation is not reasonable and/or would impose 
an undue hardship. 
Three customer preferences have sometimes been able to enter this 
opening: (1) aesthetic appeal; (2) the desire not to feel proselytized to or 
judged; and (3) convenience. The aesthetic appeal preference appears in this 
opening when employers have appearance-related rules (most commonly 
relating to headcoverings, body-piercings, and beards) that conflict with 
employees’ religious practice, and the employers argue that exempting 
religious employees from those rules would turn off customers.38  The non-
proselytization/judgment preference appears when employees seek to convey 
religious messages to customers39 or to refuse to perform certain aspects of 
the job for religious reasons.40  Here, employers argue that the likely 
customer offense renders the accommodation unreasonable and/or likely to 
impose an undue hardship.41  Finally, the convenience preference appears as 
a supporting preference when religious employees seek to opt out of certain 
aspects of the job, and the requested accommodation would inconvenience 
customers by making them find another employee to serve them.42 
D. The “Equal Burdens” Doctrine 
The final customer preference opening appears not in the actual text 
of Title VII, but from a judicially-created doctrine for interpreting Title VII’s 
ban on disparate treatment based on sex.  This doctrine, known as the “equal 
                                               
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); § 2000e(j). 
 38. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 128 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(upholding Costco’s no-body-piercing rule in the face of a challenge from a religious 
employee who said that her membership in the Church of Body Modification required her to 
display her piercing, on grounds that Costco had made out the undue hardship defense). 
 39. See, e.g., Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics, Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(ruling in favor of employer that would not allow religious employee to say “Have a blessed 
day” to customers). 
 40. See, e.g., Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(ruling in favor of employer that would not allow religious employee to refuse to counsel gay 
clients about their romantic relationships). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, 232 F. App’x 581, 582 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(ruling against a pharmacist who was terminated after he placed customers on indefinite holds 
when they sought to fill birth control prescriptions, because the accommodation he 
requested—refusing to interact in any way with customers seeking birth control—imposed an 
undue hardship given that the only alternatives were keeping customers waiting or forcing 
other employees to assume a disproportionate workload). 
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burdens” standard, provides that gender-differentiated appearance 
requirements for male and female employees do not violate Title VII unless 
the requirements impose unequal burdens on men and women.43  Typically, 
these appearance requirements—which require employees to conform with 
traditional gender stereotypes about how males and females should appear, 
such as by requiring female employees to have long hair and wear make-
up—stem from customers’ expressed or assumed aesthetic appeal 
preferences.44  Courts have tended to apply this “equal burdens” test 
remarkably loosely, deferring even to those preferences that are quite 
obviously more burdensome on women than men.45 
Thus, this doctrine—like the “job-related and consistent with 
business necessity” and “undue hardship” defenses—provides another 
opening through which customer preferences for aesthetic appeal can justify 
certain forms of discriminatory treatment. 
E.  Reflections on the Broader Context  
In sum, Title VII’s four customer preference openings have given 
rise so far to six “preferred preferences,” as noted above: (1) aesthetic appeal; 
(2) physical privacy from employees of the opposite sex; (3) psychological 
comfort/affinity with employees of the same sex; (4) an English-speaking 
environment; (5) the desire not to be proselytized to/feel judged; and (6) 
convenience.  To be sure, courts do not always defer to these preferences.46  
But each of these six preferences has, at least occasionally, provided the basis 
for a successful employer defense to a Title VII discrimination claim.47  As I 
have written elsewhere, the strongly preferred preferences (i.e., the ones to 
which courts frequently defer) are physical privacy from the opposite sex, an 
English-speaking environment, and the desire not to be proselytized to or feel 
judged; the moderately preferred preferences (the ones to which courts 
sometimes defer) are aesthetic appeal and convenience; and the weakly 
preferred preference (the one to which courts only occasionally defer) is 
psychological comfort with the same sex.48 
Although the preferred preferences are substantively very different, 
they share some common threads.  They seem to intuitively strike courts as 
reasonable and natural—likely because the preferences do not immediately 
seem invidiously discriminatory and are aligned with ingrained social 
                                               
 43. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000) (“An 
appearance standard that imposes different but essentially equal burdens on men and women 
is not disparate treatment.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 45. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 46. Waldman, supra note 23, at 125 (“Judicial deference to the preference . . . varies 
according to the extent to which they find the above factors satisfied.”). 
 47. See id. at 125–51 (listing examples of a successful employer defense case for each 
of the six preferences). 
 48. Id. at 125. 
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conventions and norms.  Because the preferences seem so “normal,” courts 
tend to consider them weightier than “mere preferences” and/or view 
compliance with them as not particularly burdensome for employees.  The 
more that these two factors are satisfied in a particular case, the more 
preference deference we see.49 
Viewing the diversity preference expressed in inclusion riders within 
the broader landscape of other preferred preferences sheds light on how 
courts would—and should—treat it.  On the one hand, the above discussion 
shows that if courts were to show some deference to the diversity preference 
would not be entirely anomalous.  After all, there are already other customer 
preferences to which courts defer in the face of Title VII challenges, and 
some of them are much less consistent with Title VII’s antidiscrimination 
mandate. 
On the other hand, the above analysis also reveals some important 
differences between the diversity preference and the other preferences.  First, 
there is no clear statutory or judicially-created opening within Title VII that 
the diversity preference fits into.  Moreover, the diversity preference overtly 
challenges the status quo, as opposed to the existing preferred preferences, 
which all reinforce the status quo.  In the next section, I explore this tension, 
and also touch on the limited applicability of affirmative action doctrine in 
this area of law. 
II. WHERE DOES THE DIVERSITY PREFERENCE FIT IN? 
As described above, certain customer preferences can sometimes 
provide successful employer defenses to what would otherwise likely be 
actionable discrimination.  Moreover, some of the preferred preferences—
particularly the aesthetic appeal and English-speaking environment 
preferences—fall especially hard on women and minorities.  These two 
preferences often reinforce majority default norms about gender-
presentation, religion, and language, and burden those who deviate from 
those norms in some way.50 
In that sense, the diversity preference feels like a bracing fresh of 
breath air: a preference that actually benefits those who have historically been 
disfavored—i.e., the same types of employees who tend to get harmed by 
some of the other customer preferences.  Indeed, the diversity preference 
seems more consistent with the underlying purpose of Title VII than do some 
of the already-preferred preferences within the Title VII landscape.  But it 
still faces doctrinal challenges. 
                                               
 49. Id. at 96. 
 50. Id. at 158; see also Jesperson, 444 F.3d at 1110–13. 
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A.  The Existing Diversity Preference Openings: An Awkward Fit 
Can the diversity preference be neatly slotted into any of the existing 
customer preference openings within Title VII?  Not easily.  The religion-
specific “undue hardship” opening is clearly inapplicable here, since these 
preferences are not about religion.  The “job-related and consistent with 
business necessity” opening, while perhaps initially tempting, does not work 
because that defense only applies in the context of disparate impact claims.51  
Overtly taking an employee’s gender or ethnicity into account in order to 
respond to a customer’s diversity preference amounts to disparate treatment, 
not disparate impact. 
That leaves us with the remaining two customer preference 
openings: the statutory BFOQ defense and the judicially-created “equal 
burdens” doctrine (whereby gender-differentiated appearance codes are not 
seen as amounting to disparate treatment unless they are unequally 
burdensome). 
The BFOQ defense is unlikely to work.  By its very terms, it does 
not cover race or color—just sex, religion, and national origin.  Additionally, 
the only situation in which customer preferences have given rise to a 
successful BFOQ is when some sort of privacy interest (typically a physical 
privacy interest) is at stake.52  That is inapplicable to the types of diversity 
preferences expressed in the inclusion riders or corporate policies described 
above.  Those preferences are not being expressed in the context of situations 
where a customer will be seen nude or will even converse about emotionally 
intimate topics with an employee.  Rather, the above-described policies relate 
to the formation of diverse teams of employees in contexts that are not 
particularly private. 
The “equal burdens” defense has more potential.  First, since this 
doctrine is judicially-created, judges could theoretically choose to expand it 
beyond the narrow context of gender-differentiated appearance codes where 
it is currently applied.  Additionally, the spirit of the “equal burdens” 
doctrine—that sometimes, differential treatment is acceptable, as long as the 
overall result is not unequally burdensome53—is somewhat applicable here.  
The above-described corporate policies all establish quantitative 
requirements that leave room for men (and non-minorities) to still hold the 
majority of positions, so it would be hard for them to argue that they are being 
unequally burdened.54  Similarly, the inclusion rider template developed by 
Professor Smith and her associates is largely focused on increasing the 
                                               
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 52. Emily Gold Waldman, The Case of the Male OB-GYN: A Proposal for Expansion 
of the Privacy BFOQ in the Healthcare Context, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 357, 372–88 (2004) 
(discussing privacy BFOQs created by several lower courts). 
 53. See, e.g., Viscecchia v. Alrose Allegria LLC, 117 F. Supp. 3d 243, 250–53 (2015) 
(summarizing the case law in this area). 
 54. See supra text accompanying note 12–14. 
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proportion of under-represented groups, not on giving such groups a 
disproportionate advantage. 
That said, I am not at all confident that courts would, of their own 
accord, undertake what would obviously be a sizeable expansion of the 
“equal burdens” doctrine.  As noted above, right now the doctrine only 
applies to the narrow context of gender-differentiated appearance codes, not 
to other forms of gender-differentiated treatment, let alone to explicitly-
differentiated treatment based on characteristics other than gender (namely, 
race and ethnicity).55 
Moreover, such an expansion—i.e., basically giving employers free 
rein to respond to the diversity preference, as long as the overall quantitative 
requirements do not disproportionately burden any particular group—would 
involve a very different approach to customer preferences than the one courts 
have historically followed.  As noted above, the customer preferences that 
receive the most deference tend to be the ones that align with ingrained social 
conventions and norms, to the point that they seem reasonable, natural, and 
even near-invisible at times.56  The diversity preference, in trying to change 
rather than reinforce the default, is much more visible and blatant.  That does 
not mean that it is necessarily suspect or wrongheaded—quite the contrary.  
But it does mean that it is less likely to fly under the radar and more likely to 
trigger close analysis. 
B. What About Affirmative Action Doctrine? 
It is also worth considering whether employers can invoke 
affirmative action doctrine to justify their satisfaction of third parties’ 
diversity preferences.  Here, too, there are major wrinkles.  The Supreme 
Court’s (scant) discussion in the Title VII context has indeed indicated that 
there is some room for employers to engage in voluntary affirmative action 
programs “designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in 
traditionally segregated job categories.”57  However, there are several key 
differences between a traditional affirmative action program and an 
employer’s decision to take sex or ethnicity into account in response to 
specific diversity requests by customers, clients, or A-list celebrities. 
First, in all of the cases where an affirmative action program was 
upheld (whether under Title VII or, in the case of public universities, the 
Equal Protection Clause), the defendant entity had a general affirmative 
action policy that it had itself developed and implemented and was now 
standing behind.58  That is very different from a situation in which the 
                                               
 55. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(discussing the doctrine of unequal burdens and gender appearance codes). 
 56. Waldman, supra note 23, at 125. 
 57. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979). 
 58. See, e.g., id.; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 313 (2003). 
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employer lacks a comprehensive policy and merely engages in diverse 
staffing to the extent that a particular customer, client, or celebrity demands 
it. 
Second, and relatedly, the reasons for a particular customer, client, 
or celebrity to demand such diversity are typically multi-faceted and 
expressed in broad, almost tautological terms.  For example, Facebook’s 
general counsel justified its diversity policy simply by stating that “we want 
to see [our law firms] win our cases and create opportunities for women and 
people of color.”59 Similarly, HP’s Chief Legal Officer stated that “Our 
vision at HP is to create technology that makes the world a better place for 
everyone, everywhere.  To achieve that vision, business leaders must 
represent the diversity of our customers and stakeholders.”60  The inclusion 
rider template similarly states, in its statement of purpose, that “increasing 
the number of females—particularly recognizing the intersectional 
discrimination faced by females of color—and individuals from other under-
represented groups . . . will facilitate employment and create a stronger 
pipeline for diverse representation on screen.”61  Indeed, the benchmark for 
meeting the diversity goal in connection with the casting of supporting roles 
is not the relevant labor market of employees, but rather “the expected 
demographics of the film’s setting.”62 
These broad rationales differ from the traditional, remedial, Supreme 
Court-approved rationale for affirmative action under Title VII, which, as 
Deborah Malamud has written, was explicitly “aimed at remedying an 
imbalance caused by race or gender discrimination in labor markets.”63  
Malamud has contrasted this focus to today’s “diversity” rationale, under 
which “employers seek to increase the representation of members in 
underrepresented groups not with reference to the ‘balance’ that would exist 
absent discrimination (measured by some relationship to a relevant labor 
market), but rather with reference to one of any number of business goals 
their presence is said to serve.”64  The diversity preference cases, of course, 
involve another wrinkle: it is not even the employer itself articulating those 
goals, but the customer/client/celebrity whom the employer simply wants to 
please.  Thus, Malamud’s prediction that the Supreme Court is likely to reject 
a diversity-based rationale for affirmative action under Title VII65 seems to 
apply with even fuller force to this situation. 
A final—and very important—reason why employers are unlikely to 
be able to successfully invoke the affirmative action doctrine as a defense for 
satisfying their clients’ diversity preferences is that the diversity preferences 
                                               
 59. See Rosen, supra note 12. 
 60. See Rivera, supra note 13. 
 61. See Kotagel, supra note 8, at ¶1. 
 62. Id. at ¶4.a.ii. 
 63. Deborah Malamud, The Strange Persistence of Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 
118 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015). 
 64. Id. at 5. 
 65. Id. at 9, 21–23. 
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are often framed in numerical terms.66  Even in the educational context, 
where the Supreme Court has been more open to the diversity rationale for 
affirmative action, it has still shunned any use of quotas or hard numerical 
targets.  That concern dates back to Regents of University of California v. 
Bakke,67 and was echoed in the Supreme Court’s split result when it decided 
Grutter v. Bollinger68 and Gratz v. Bollinger69 on the same day in June of 
2003.  There, the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s 
affirmative action admissions policy in Grutter while rejecting its 
undergraduate affirmative action admissions policy in Gratz, in large part 
because of Gratz’s more quantitative approach (in attaching 20 points to the 
composite admissions score of any applicant from an underrepresented 
minority group).  Indeed, the Grutter court specifically emphasized that in 
establishing affirmative action programs, “universities cannot establish 
quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups 
on separate admissions tracks.”70 
The Supreme Court echoed this concern in Parents Involved v. 
Seattle School District 1.71  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for four justices, 
stated, 
[T]he racial balance the districts seek is a defined range set 
solely by reference to the demographics of the respective 
school districts. This working backward to achieve a 
particular type of racial balance, rather than working 
forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity 
that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our 
existing precedent.72 
While Justice Kennedy did not join that portion of the opinion, his 
separate concurrence also indicated a rejection of explicit racial targets as 
opposed to facially-neutral measures for achieving diversity.73 
Indeed, the strength of the Supreme Court’s disfavor toward 
numerical targets in achieving diversity is not only problematic for the 
affirmative action rationale.  It is also quite likely to have a chilling effect on 
courts considering an expansion of the “equal burdens” doctrine to this 
setting. 
                                               
 66. See Rivera, supra note 13. 
 67. 438 U.S. 265, 270–71 (1978) (holding the school’s policy of accepting a specified 
number of minority students unlawful but still allowing minority status to be taken into 
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 68. 539 U.S. 306, 333–34 (2003). 
 69. 539 U.S. 244, 280 (2003). 
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 71. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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C. The Best Way for Employers to Satisfy the Diversity Preference 
Where does that leave us?  Are employers who comply with the 
diversity preferences expressed by customers, clients, or celebrities simply 
waiting to be on the losing end of a Title VII lawsuit?  Much will depend on 
how they comply.  If they satisfy the preference narrowly—for example, by 
simply rejiggering a few client teams to meet the numerical targets of the 
clients who specifically request a certain percentage of women or minorities, 
or by adopting special staffing approaches for crew positions when an A-list 
celebrity with an inclusion rider is cast in a movie—then they are indeed at 
risk.  For the reasons stated above, an employer’s defense that it was simply 
satisfying a preference expressed by a customer, client, or celebrity is 
unlikely to work here. 
On the other hand, if employers take a broader approach, in which 
they adopt mechanisms and policies that are designed to promote equal 
employment opportunity for all prospective and current employees in 
connection with recruiting, hiring, training, and staffing, then they will be on 
much safer ground.  First, over time this will enable employers to more 
naturally satisfy the variously-expressed diversity preferences, since the 
employers will have a more diverse workforce.  In other words, there will be 
less need for active “rejiggering” of client teams to meet particular diversity 
goals of specific clients; the client teams should organically become much 
more diverse.  Second, such policies will limit any individual employee’s 
opportunity for a successful Title VII lawsuit, since a threshold requirement 
of Title VII is to show some sort of measurable harm.74  If all employees are 
truly receiving equal opportunities, a court is less likely to find that a 
deprivation in violation of Title VII has occurred. 
                                               
 74. Title VII makes it unlawful both (1) to “discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” and (2) to “limit, segregate, or 
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244 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:2: 229 
III. CONCLUSION 
The confluence of the corporate diversity policies and the inclusion 
rider concept is no accident.  They are both growing out of a larger frustration 
that we still have not achieved true diversity in the workplace (or on the 
movie screen) and a desire on the part of powerful corporations and 
celebrities to take matters into their own hands and use their power to effect 
change.  That sentiment is laudable.  But it is important for employers to be 
proactive—not merely reactive to the diversity preferences expressed by 
customers, clients, and celebrities.  By proactively developing policies that 
promote equal employment opportunity in connection with recruiting, hiring, 
training, and staffing, employers will help contribute to better long-term 
outcomes and protect themselves from liability under Title VII. 
